

# **PLANNING AND END STATE: HAS DOCTRINE ANSWERED THE NEED?**

**A MONOGRAPH  
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## **Abstract**

### **Planning and End State in Desert Storm: Has Doctrine Answered the Need?** By Major Emmett M. Schaill, USA, 53 pages.

The 1991 Coalition victory in Desert Storm exemplified the awesome capabilities of the US Armed Forces weapons and doctrine. The Army's Air Land Battle doctrine was finally used in combat and proven effective. The short campaign ended with the near total destruction of Iraq's army and cost few American lives. Why then, does Iraq still threaten US interests in the region? Was the war really as successful as thought or could the Coalition have done more to assure the future stability of the Persian Gulf region.

This monograph examines the planning process used to formulate the Desert Storm plan in order to determine what end state planning was done. The essential questions to answer are what, if any, end state planning was done prior to the offensive, and, what US Military doctrine existed to support end state planning at the time? The monograph then addresses what end state doctrine exists today and whether this is an adequate improvement over the doctrine existing during the war.

The monograph begins with an examination of the overarching political goals and how these were linked to the military objectives. It continues with an examination of the offensive plan to determine how each subordinate unit mission was to support achievement of the stated objectives also noting that end state was not defined or even addressed in the plan. The monograph then moves into examining the actions of the units and commanders during the ground phase and how the decision to cease offensive operations was arrived at. This to determine if any well defined end state was sought, visualized, or recognized by the theater leadership or the National Command Authority.

The monograph then proceeds with a short look at the end state doctrine in existence during Desert Storm then a look at the state of that doctrine today.

There are four major conclusions of this monograph. First, a clearly defined and recognizable end state was not addressed in the Desert Storm plan. Second, that the lack of prior planning for end state effected the long-term results of the military action. Third, that very little doctrine existed on end state at the time of the war, and, fourth, that the current doctrine is significantly improved as it requires end state planning be part of the theater campaign plan. The clarity and depth of that planning remain incumbent on the commanders and staff to address and link to the overall strategic objectives.

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## Chapter I. Introduction.

At 0500 GMT February 28<sup>th</sup> 1991, midnight in Washington D.C., the Allied Coalition in the Persian Gulf War suspended military operations, exactly 100 hours after the ground war had begun and six weeks into the air campaign. President Bush announced that the liberation of Kuwait was complete and all coalition military objectives had been met.<sup>1</sup> In Riyahd, Saudi Arabia, the previous evening, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief Central Command had briefed the world, announcing that coalition forces had destroyed 3,847 Iraqi tanks, 1,450 armored vehicles, 2,917 artillery pieces and rendered 42 of 44 Iraqi divisions in the Kuwait theater combat ineffective. Coalition ground forces were in control of Kuwait City, blocked the route from Basra to Baghdad, and had forced the remnants of the Iraqi army into a pocket south and west of Basra.<sup>2</sup>

On 3 March, at Safwan, near the Iraq-Kuwait border, Iraqi representatives signed a cease fire agreement with General Schwarzkopf and General Prince Khalid of Saudi Arabia. In this agreement Iraq agreed to rescind its order of annexation of Kuwait, release all prisoners of war and captured Kuwaitis, cease military operations, return captured property, assist in cleaning up Kuwait, and release information on chemical or biological weapons in the vicinity of Coalition forces. Later that day the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, informed the UN Secretary General by letter that Iraq would abide by the agreement.<sup>3</sup>

These facts may lead one to the conclusion that the 1991 Persian Gulf War was an unparalleled military victory for the Coalition forces. The vaunted Iraqi military, numerically fourth largest in the world, was defeated decisively in less than two months.

The stated war aims of the United Nations and the Coalition, to expel Iraq from Kuwait, reestablish the legitimate government of Kuwait, and secure Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, were all met.<sup>4</sup> One might surmise that such a lopsided military victory should have brought about the full cooperation of Iraq, now that she was stripped of her military teeth, resulting in a lasting period of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region. This expectation has not been met. The suddenness and perceived completeness of the victory surprised many on both sides and magnified the apparent lack of Allied planning for war termination.

Saddam Hussein is still in power. Iraq continues to defy UN arms inspectors. The rebuilt Iraqi army can threaten Kuwait at will, causing consternation and force deployments by interested Allies. Today, as a result of Iraq's most recent act of defiance, the US military has deployed nearly the whole Third Infantry Division to Kuwait, two carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf, and over 300 aircraft to the region. UN arms inspectors suspect that Iraq still possesses biological and chemical agents, including anthrax, aflatoxin, and VX nerve gas, as well as missiles to deliver them.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the will to continue economic sanctions against Iraq may be weakening while the United States bears much of the military burden and expends significant economic capital in continuing enforcement.

The disparity between the magnitude of the Coalition victory and the current problems with Iraq, illicits the central question of this monograph; whether, at the time, US military doctrine regarding war termination and end state was sufficient to deal with the Gulf War, and whether subsequent changes to that doctrine are adequate to meet new challenges. This monograph will examine how the war plans were intended to meet the

stated political and military objectives and what doctrine existed at the time regarding end state and conflict termination. It will then consider recent changes in the doctrine to determine whether they are sufficient in light of the Gulf War experience and possibly recommend changes.

The first section of this monograph will examine how the strategic war aims of President Bush and the Coalition were generated and refined over time and transmitted to the Central Command planning staff. It will then examine how the stated war aims were translated into military objectives for CENTCOM and its component commands. Finally, the published plans, planning processes and statements of intent of the major commanders, will be examined to understand what the Coalition forces were to accomplish and how these military objectives were linked to the political objectives of the campaign.

The essential questions to answer here are: did anyone plan for the termination of the fighting prior to beginning the campaign? and, If so, to what detail? Did General Schwarzkopf or any of his subordinate commanders address war termination or end state in any concrete way and did they establish criteria so that they would be able to shape the battlefield to support the intended conditions? Lastly, were cease-fire terms addressed prior to the January start of the war by either the military or civilian leadership of the Coalition?

The next section of the monograph looks at what actually happened at the end of Desert Storm, seeks to determine where the belligerent forces ceased operations and whether they achieved their stated objectives. This analysis will also look at how subordinate unit actions supported or failed to support the theater war plans. Critical to

this examination is investigation of the process involved in the decision to end the fighting, determination of whether this decision was made too early in light of the existing plans, and what political and military ramifications were generated by stopping operations at that point. The presumption is that the decision to cease hostilities should be tied to the end state sought by the political leadership at the beginning of the war.

The next portion of the monograph will examine the joint and US Army doctrine regarding war termination and end state definition in existence at the time of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The point of this analysis is to determine if the extant doctrine was adhered to in fact or, at least, in spirit. It will then proceed to identify the inadequacies in the doctrine brought out by the Gulf War experience and how they effected the planning process and end state in the war.

The final section will look at the current doctrine on end state and war termination published in Joint Publications 3.0 and 5.0, as well as Army FM 100-5. The examination here seeks to answer the question of whether our current doctrine deals adequately with the military and political imperatives of addressing end state in the planning process. If current doctrine does not, what changes are required in light of the Gulf War experience and limited wars in general? With which tools or capabilities should our military arm its planning staffs and commanders in order to better plan and accomplish war termination and end state in the future?

This monograph concludes with a short analysis and restatement of its major points. It will then recommend necessary changes to the current doctrine in order to facilitate better definition of end state in future plans and greater understanding by future commanders that planning for war termination and end state is a crucial part of their responsibility.

## Chapter II. Background and Planning.

On August 2, 1990, at 0200, elements of Iraq's battle hardened Republican Guard, the Hammurabi armored and the Tawakalna mechanized divisions, supported by special forces and the Medina armored division, attacked the tiny nation of Kuwait. The Iraqi's drove hard on the capital, Kuwait City, capturing it by 1400. The small Kuwaiti army and air force were quickly overwhelmed, no match for the fourth largest army in the world and the onslaught of nearly 1000 T72 tanks. This surprise attack awakened the world to the danger of Iraq and its war machine and precipitated operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.<sup>6</sup> Why did Saddam invade Kuwait and endanger his army and regime?

Historically, Kuwait is a very old entity, yet young as a nation in the modern sense. Its development was linked strongly to the merchant and maritime trade of the Persian Gulf creating historical ties to Oman, Bahrain and other trading sultanates along the Gulf.<sup>7</sup> The ruling Al Sabah family can trace its emirate back at least to 1756, a counter to the claim of traditional Iraqi sovereignty. In 1914, in order to counter the hegemony of the Ottomans, Kuwait, along with other Gulf States, agreed to place its foreign relations in the hands of Great Britain.<sup>8</sup> This led to a 47 year long relationship under the British Empire. Kuwait finally attained its full independence June 19, 1961.

The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis is not the first instance of the government of Iraq claiming Kuwait as its own. In 1961, six days after Kuwait's independence, Iraq claimed the nation as an Iraqi province. Kuwait quickly requested British protection and was admitted to the Arab League. Both these maneuvers served to effectively counter the Iraqi threat.

It is worth noting that even though Iraq and Kuwait are adjacent to each other, they have been viewed as separate entities for centuries. The fact that a number of empires have owned or controlled both nations throughout their history provides little support to the Iraqi claim of sovereignty over the entirety of Kuwait.<sup>9</sup> The Iraqi claim to Kuwait derives from the seemingly arbitrary border drawn by Sir Percy Cox, Britain's High Commissioner in Baghdad, after WWI. Cox drew the line with little attention to Iraq's need for a port on the Gulf and certainly without any knowledge of where future oil deposits might lie. According to some scholars, the border was drawn purposefully, in order to prevent Iraq from becoming a Gulf state and dominating the weaker states of the area.<sup>10</sup> The 1990 invasion of Kuwait has its roots in this history while its more immediate causes lie in the regime of Saddam Hussein and the long war with Iran.

Saddam took power in Iraq in 1979, hoping to become the preeminent leader on the Arab world. He launched the war with Iran in September of 1980 under the pretense of an Iranian refusal to return Iraqi territory and with the belief that Iran had been weakened decisively by its recent revolution. Saddam's armies quickly occupied the entire Shatt al-Arab gaining, for a time, position on the Persian Gulf. Iraq, although clearly the aggressor, was supported with money and material by a number of other Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Over the course of the war Saddam spent about 42.8 billion dollars directly on armaments and nearly that amount on other projects.

Iraq emerged from the war in 1988 with no significant gain in territory, the fourth largest army in the world, a costly victory over Iran, and nearly 100 billion dollars in debt. Iraq found itself in a quandary. It generated only 7 billion dollars in oil revenues annually, enough only to service the debt on its loans, and could not hope to raise this

revenue in the near term as other OPEC nations, especially Kuwait, would not stay within their OPEC production quotas. This served to depress the price of all oil.

In early 1990, Saddam made six demands of Kuwait: 1) That she end oil production in excess of her quota; 2) That Iraq be granted control or lease of one of two islands in the Gulf in order to provide access to the waterway; 3) The demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border allowing Iraq primary control of the Rumaylah oil field; 4) That Kuwait compensate Iraq for suspected slant drilling across the border; 5) The forgiveness of outstanding loans; and 6) Granting of new financial assistance.<sup>11</sup> Kuwait refused to agree to these demands but agreed to hold talks with Iraq. Rhetoric intensified throughout 1990 and culminated on July 17<sup>th</sup> with a speech by Saddam in which he stated that low oil prices were a “poisoned dagger” pointed at Iraq, and, “If words fail...we will have no choice other than to go into action to reestablish the correct state of affairs and restore our rights.”<sup>12</sup> He also reemphasized the charge that Kuwait was slant drilling into Iraq’s oil fields thereby stealing from him and Iraq.<sup>13</sup> Talks occurred in late July 1990 but broke off on August 1<sup>st</sup> with an agreement to reconvene in Baghdad.<sup>14</sup>

Prior to these talks, the US ambassador was summoned to an audience with Saddam on July 25<sup>th</sup> to discuss the matter. At this meeting the Iraqi President promised, in person, to the US ambassador, and telephonically to Egypt’s president Mubarak, not to solve his problems with violence and that no action would occur before the talks with Kuwait resumed.<sup>15</sup> Neither the ambassador nor President Mubarak knew that in mid-July Saddam had ordered the commander of the Republican Guards, Lieutenant General Ayad Futayih al-Rawi, to prepare to invade Kuwait and that already, on the 25<sup>th</sup>, he had over 3000 vehicles near the border with Kuwait.

What did Saddam Hussein expect to gain by invading his weaker neighbor and subjecting his nation to possible defeat? First, and perhaps foremost, he expected to alleviate his economic woes. The seizure of Kuwait's oil would put 18% of the current world oil reserves under his control.<sup>16</sup> Second, Iraq would gain access to the Persian Gulf and solve its long-term goal of adjusting the border with Kuwait. Third, Iraq, thus Saddam, would become the recognized leader of the Arab world. He would become champion of the mass of Muslims who resented the lavish lifestyles of the rich Gulf State Leaders.<sup>17</sup> Lastly, Saddam would have found a use for the large army he had created to defeat Iran and was unable (or unwilling) to dismantle, as the economy would not support the former soldiers.<sup>18</sup> The war would pay for itself many times over.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait prompted quick action on the part of the United States and CENTCOM. Warnings of probable invasion had been rumbling around the Pentagon and intelligence agencies for several weeks but few actually expected it to occur.<sup>19</sup> This invasion was perceived to be an immediate threat to US interests in the region, to the future of Saudi Arabia and to the large oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.

US interests in the region have developed over time. They include the free flow of oil as the centerpiece, but stretch beyond that limited objective. President Bush reaffirmed America's vital interests in the region in National Security Directive 26 issued in October 1989. In this document the President clearly warned that the US would defend its interests in the region by force, if necessary. CENTCOM's regional objectives, as presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, on February 8, 1990, were: To ensure access to Arabian Peninsula oil; maintain effective and visible US presence throughout the region; assist friendly states to improve their own defensive capabilities;

prevent the military coercion of friendly states; and deter or counter aggression against vital US interests.

These stated interests were supported before the invasion of Kuwait with several important strategies. First, the US, through CENTCOM, would seek to build coalitions and counter Soviet influence. Second, CENTCOM would deploy forces rapidly to deter or terminate conflicts early. Third, the US would take necessary action to ensure access to oil and to keep the sea LOC's open to the region.<sup>20</sup> It is from this strategic setting that the political and military objectives of Desert Storm ultimately emerge.

US response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began almost immediately after the event. General Schwarzkopf was called to Washington to brief President Bush and members of the National Security Council several times from August 2-5, 1990. The information in these briefings was critical in formulating the national strategic objectives in this crisis. The President first wanted to know what was going on and what the US and CENTCOM could do about it.

Initially, the first recognized political objective was to protect Saudi Arabia. There appeared a strong possibility that Iraq would pause, then attack into the Kingdom to seize another 20% of the world's oil reserves. Protecting the desert kingdom would require significant US forces so a US delegation was sent to brief King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on the Iraqi troop dispositions along his border with Kuwait and to gain his permission for deployment. A strong commitment of US forces, it was felt, would send a message to Saddam to not cross the line.<sup>21</sup>

This initial defensive stand did not last long in the President's mind. Following consultation with Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, the President gave

his “This will not stand” speech on the White House lawn. Here he defined the US long-term goal as the reversal of the takeover of Kuwait, not yet a commitment to offensive operations but it was the beginning of the political decision to go to war.<sup>22</sup>

Fortuitously for the US, CENTCOM had recently completed a reassessment of theater threats that culminated in the Internal Look 1990 joint command post exercise held in July. The relevant plan, called Oplan 1002-90, was based on an Iraqi attack through Kuwait to seize the oil and coastal facilities of Saudi Arabia along the Gulf down to Al Jabayl. In reaction, the US would deploy an Army corps, a Marine division, significant aircraft, and support forces. The initial mission of these forces was to defend the critical sea and air facilities to facilitate further US reinforcement. This planning exercise enabled CENTCOM and its supporting commands to consider the campaign they were about to undertake prior to the event. The benefits included an evaluation of the required missions and capabilities; the forces needed to accomplish these missions and a significant capability to execute the defensive plan, once ordered. The CPX provided a baseline plan, understood by the major subordinates, and allowed decisive execution.<sup>23</sup> When Schwarzkopf briefed the President on OPLAN 1002-90 he emphasized it was capable only of defending Saudi Arabia, more forces would be required for an offensive option.<sup>24</sup>

The order to deploy forces came late on August 6<sup>th</sup> after King Fahd had agreed to accept US forces in his Kingdom. US Air Force F-15s arrived in Dhahran on August 8<sup>th</sup><sup>25</sup> and lead elements of the US XVIIIth Corps arrived on the 9<sup>th</sup>.<sup>26</sup> The deployment of US forces would continue for the next seven months as the political goals changed and the mission evolved from one of defense to one of attack.

President Bush clearly identified the overarching political goals of the US in an address to the nation on August 8<sup>th</sup>. He issued four policy imperatives: 1) the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 2) restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; 3) the security and stability of the Gulf region; and 4) protection of the lives of Americans abroad. This last goal, was a reference to the Americans held hostage by Iraq. The President emphasized that a puppet regime in Kuwait was unacceptable and that the security of Saudi Arabia was of vital interest to the United States. He also stated that these policy objectives would remain unchanged.<sup>27</sup>

Internationally, a number of organizations quickly condemned the action by Iraq, including the European Community, which implemented sanctions on August 4<sup>th</sup>, and the Arab League, which voted on August 10<sup>th</sup> to send troops to assist in defending Saudi Arabia. The latter was significant in that Arab nations had agreed to fight alongside western troops to defend one Arab nation from another.<sup>28</sup>

The critical international actions began in the United Nations on the day of the invasion with resolution 660 condemning Iraq's action. Resolution 661 followed on August 6<sup>th</sup> and imposed economic sanctions upon Iraq. Resolution 662 followed on the 9<sup>th</sup>, affirming the previous resolutions and mirroring President Bush's call for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and reestablishment of the legitimate government.<sup>29</sup>

The Bush administration was taking the lead among other nations in pulling together a coalition to support the UN sanctions and to achieve the eventual ouster of Iraq from Kuwait. An international coalition of nations and forces was critical to the success of Desert Shield for several reasons. First, it provided legitimacy. A broadbased international coalition permitted the US claim that it acted as representative of world

opinion. This supported action and policy both domestically and abroad. Second, the presence of Arab forces in the coalition strengthened Saudi resolve and tended to legitimize the action of Arab against Arab. Third, a broad international coalition isolated Iraq both economically and in the realm of public opinion, debasing its claims to act with legitimacy. Lastly, the coalition gained both financially and in terms of the numbers of forces available to support its operations.<sup>30</sup>

The political objectives for Desert Shield were now in place. The immediate objectives were to defend the Kingdom from Iraqi attack, continue to build up and sustain forces for the defense, enforce the economic embargo as required, and maintain the coalition.

Initial planning for the defense of Saudi Arabia, was accomplished as part of Oplan 1002-90. Offensive planning began about a week into the crisis when General Powell asked the CINC how the Iraqi's could be kicked out of Kuwait with the current 1002-90 force, both air and ground. The compelling rationale was that the coalition forces must be prepared to react in case of an Iraqi preemptive attack or harming of hostages.<sup>31</sup> Schwarzkopf balked, knowing he would not be prepared for a ground offensive for months. He understood, however, the need to begin planning for an offensive even if plans were limited strictly to air.<sup>32</sup>

Colonel John Warden, the director of the Air Force Strategy office known as Checkmate, briefed the initial concept for an initial air campaign to the CINC on August 16th. The campaign, called Instant Thunder, targeted the command and control facilities required to run the country, seeking to incapacitate the leadership along with other strategic targets. Warden's intent was to cause the defeat of Iraq with airpower alone and

he chose not to attack enemy ground forces. The plan exemplified his belief, and that of some others in the Air Force, that airpower alone could oust Iraq from Kuwait.<sup>33</sup> This plan was not adopted as briefed but laid the groundwork for the air campaign to follow. It also provided the CINC with the genesis of what became the phases of the Desert Storm plan. These were; 1) Instant Thunder; 2) achieve air superiority; 3) attrition of enemy ground forces by 50%; and 4) the ground campaign.<sup>34</sup>

Colonel Warden flew to Riyadh after briefing the CINC, in order to brief LTG Horner, CENTAF Commander and BG Buster Glosson, CENTAF air planner. The two CENTCOM Air Force generals were less than pleased with the plan, but incorporated much of it into a comprehensive air plan that could stand alone or work as part of a greater concept of operations.<sup>35</sup> The intent of this air plan, completed in early September, was to halt any Iraqi attack or punish them for further wrongful acts.<sup>36</sup>

Political considerations influenced CENTCOM planning and its time table from the outset. The President had defined quickly the overall political objectives, had acted to gain worldwide support in the UN, and had formed an effective multinational coalition. The administration had other considerations, which came to bear heavily on CENTCOM operations and planning. First, sanctions were in place early in the crisis but no one knew how long they would take to be effective or even if they would work to oust Saddam. President Bush believed that every day that he delayed reestablishing the legitimate government of Kuwait he was further from that possibility altogether. The President was, therefore, working under an unstated timetable from the outset.<sup>37</sup> Second, every day of waiting might weaken the coalition and provide Saddam an opening to berate America about its long-standing support of Israel, a significant issue among the Arabs.

Bush also had to consider the costs in popular support arising from American impatience with the delay in sanctions taking effect, against the looming possibility of high American casualties in the event of a ground war with Iraq. These competing concerns underscored the President's decisions throughout the crisis.

A final political consideration that would come to be a critical component of the Desert Storm plan involved the transition to an offensive strategy that would both free Kuwait and destroy Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors. The stated objective of post war stability in the Gulf would not be accomplished simply with the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Something had to be done to destroy the Iraqi offensive capability, to include her stockpile of missiles and any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons that could be employed. Bush, and the administration, were cautious, however, in the extent of the required destruction. They did not want Iraq reduced so much that it would be at the mercy of Syria or Iran. Iraq was useful as a balancing weight in the region. The desire was to prune back the vine a bit.

Bush also did not support any military effort to sweep into Baghdad with ground forces to eliminate or capture Saddam. Such action was not supported by UN resolution and probably would not have been agreed to by the Arab coalition members. If, however, Saddam was removed by coup or accidental death, that was another matter. First of all, however, the coalition must remain viable in order to accomplish the UN and US objectives. President Bush, the Administration and CENTCOM understood that fact and planned accordingly.

Offensive planning for a ground attack began in earnest in mid September with the arrival of a team of four officers headed by then LTC Joseph Purvis. General

Schwarzkopf requested a team of Advanced Military Studies Program graduates from the Army Chief of Staff in early September as he felt the CENTCOM team was “not creative enough”.<sup>38</sup> The resident planners were quite busy establishing the defense which would not be in place fully until mid October.<sup>39</sup>

On September 18<sup>th</sup> the new team met with the CINC for its initial guidance. First, they were to make the best use of the available forces in theater. US ground forces were the XVIII Airborne Corps composed of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized) (ID(M)), the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division (CD), the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, the 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), and one combat aviation brigade (CAB)) and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.<sup>40</sup> Coalition forces would have to be given tasks commensurate with their capabilities. Second, Arab forces would be used to seize Kuwait City.<sup>41</sup> Third, the CINC identified as geographic objectives the key terrain consisting of Al Jara/ Mutlock Ridge north of Kuwait City. Two major roads running between Basrah and Kuwait City converged in this vicinity. The terrain offered the owner command of the gate into Kuwait City and the route to Basrah.<sup>42</sup>

The CINC gave other overall guidance that the plan was to remain absolutely secret, from the Iraqi's, for obvious reasons, and from the allies because an offensive option had yet to be briefed to King Fahd.<sup>43</sup> General Schwarzkopf also emphasized that the plan must not result in attrition warfare. Neither he nor the President would support such a plan. This led immediately to a search for a maneuver using an indirect approach, an attempt to avoid the enemy strengths as much as possible.<sup>44</sup>

The planning process began with mission analysis and an analysis of the situation, both enemy and friendly.

The team began mission analysis by studying the President's stated objectives: unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, security and stability in the region, restoration of the Kuwaiti government, and protection of American citizens (important due to the number of Americans and foreign nationals held hostage by Saddam). The team also considered the implied goals of continued access to oil, maintenance of the coalition and strengthening future US relationships in the Gulf Region. There was no single document that listed all of the political and military objectives or considerations; much of that was to be deduced during the process itself.<sup>45</sup>

At this stage the military objective remained simply to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, then be prepared to defend against further attack. The political goal of regional stability had yet to evolve into one of reducing Iraq's offensive capability. In the search for a clear end state, the planners agreed that, with the forces available, they could only accomplish the goal of ousting Iraq from Kuwait. They had enough force to attack to cut the LOC's and seize the terrain north of Kuwait City then let the Iraqi's contest it. They did not have enough force to attack directly into the enemy's teeth or seek out a decisive maneuver battle with the Republican Guard.<sup>46</sup>

The planning group, known later as the "Jedi Knights", developed several key assumptions based on their analysis. First, they would plan to fight only the minimum numbers of enemy required, as the CINC had emphasized. Second, airpower must reduce enemy ground forces by 50% in order to insure more favorable force ratios and lessen risk. This assumption developed early in the CINC's mind and was retained as a subordinate air force objective throughout execution. Third, accurate and timely intelligence would be essential to victory. Last, logistics considerations were the key to

the plan. Large mechanized units depend upon large and reliable support. Threats to the lines of communication, ports or airfields had to be reduced to the minimum.<sup>47</sup>

The team developed then briefed three courses of action to the CINC on October 6<sup>th</sup>.

The first COA (recommended and later accepted by the CINC) was to attack about 60 km east of the tri-border area into the elbow of Kuwait with the 24<sup>th</sup> ID(M), 1<sup>st</sup> CD, and 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR (XVIIIth Corps), to seize the area north of Kuwait City. The Marines would protect the right flank along with Arab forces. Upon seizing its objective, the XVIIIth corps could move north to the border with Iraq and hope the Republican Guards, located on the Iraqi border as theater reserve, would attack. If not, they would be attacked only from the air.

The other two COA's were attacks west of the Wadi Al-Batin, near the tri-border area, that followed axes of advance roughly tracing the Kuwaiti border. These would avoid the Iraqi defenses but involve significant logistical challenges and greater risk. Sending the one corps force so far around to the west strained logistics and set the force up to be cut off by an Iraqi spoiling attack south, or counterattack by the Republican Guards.<sup>48</sup>

Under protest from the CINC, the one corps ground plan and the already developed air plan were packaged and briefed to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and other advisors in Washington on 11 October. The air plan was well received but the ground plan led to significant criticism and consternation. At the end MG Johnston, CENTCOM Chief of Staff reiterated the CINC's discomfort with the plan and said that with another corps they would have the force available to accomplish Bush's goals. This was soon to result in the commitment of another Corps to the offensive option.<sup>49</sup>

General Schwarzkopf directed that the planners begin planning a two corps attack on 15 October while continuing to develop the single corps concept of operation.<sup>50</sup> He also brought 3<sup>rd</sup> Army into the planning process since they were to command Army forces during the operation and would have the critical task of logistics planning and execution.<sup>51</sup> Initially, the planners did not assume which corps would be added, only that it would be a heavy corps, probably of two divisions, and an ACR. The primary COA considered, and the one ultimately chosen, placed the two corps abreast with the XVIIIth Corps on the west. The other considered COA's put the XVIIIth Corps further east and passed one corps through the other.<sup>52</sup>

The plans group briefed the CINC on October 21<sup>st</sup>. He approved, as the CENTCOM main effort, the recommended COA of the two Army corps attacking west of the tri-border area in order to bypass the majority of the defenses. The tentative objectives were to block the escape of the Republican Guard divisions along the Basrah-Baghdad highway and to envelop them from the west. The Air Force was to block passage north of the Shatt al Arab, preventing escape of the Iraqi's.

Schwarzkopf showed enthusiasm for the two corps abreast concept and began brain storming what the force alignment might be as the initial objectives were met. Pointing to a map of the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) the CINC stated "With these two corps ... I've got forces here (pointing at Kuwait), I sit on highway 8, ... I've threatened his Republican Guard, now I'll destroy it."<sup>53</sup> The CINC gave specific guidance to the planning team. He identified three operational centers of gravity for the Iraqi forces in the KTO; the Republican Guard, enemy logistics, and his command and control capabilities. General Schwarzkopf was emphatic in his intent that the Republican Guard forces must

be destroyed.<sup>54</sup> He reiterated, as well, his intent that suitable missions be assigned to the Marines and coalition forces.<sup>55</sup>

General Powell, the CJCS, arrived 22 October and received a briefing on both plans. The chairman still required convincing that the single corps plan was too risky but acceded in the end. Interestingly, at this second brief to General Powell, the CINC's intent had evolved so that it now included destruction of the Republican Guard (RG). The planning team came to realize, as had much of the staff, that the enemy's ability to conduct a coordinated defense in the KTO and the future stability of the region, a political goal, rested on the fate of the RG. Destruction of the RG became a strategic, as well as, operational goal.<sup>56</sup>

General Powell agreed that the two corps option was preferred but could not yet guarantee that the NCA would support such a troop increase. The Chairman discussed some possible refinements to the plan, as well, and agreed with the 90-day deployment estimate. The time estimate was critical due to the desire of President Bush to expedite ending the crisis and the belief that an attack later than mid March would move into the warm season and the Islamic Holy Days.<sup>57</sup>

The visit ended with Powell telling the CINC to tell him what he needed to support the mission and assuring him that if the President decided to pursue the offensive option he, the President, would provide all the forces required. General Powell indicated as well, that the announcement would have to wait until after the November 6<sup>th</sup> elections.<sup>58</sup> The Chairman briefed President Bush on the two corps concept on 30 October, securing his approval and setting in motion the offensive option.<sup>59</sup> President Bush announced the

deployment of VIIth Corps from Europe to Saudi Arabia on November 6<sup>th</sup>, 1990, so that the Coalition Forces would have an “adequate offensive military option”.<sup>60</sup>

### The Desert Storm Plan.

Following the announcement of the force increase, planning concentrated entirely on preparations for an offensive. General Schwarzkopf held a critical commander’s conference on November 14<sup>th</sup> in Riyahd. He laid out the major points of the two corps attack and, in general terms, articulated his intent. The CINC intended first to, attack the enemy command and control capabilities, second, gain and maintain air superiority, third, cut the enemy LOC’s to the KTO and destroy their NBC capability, and fourth, destroy the Republican Guard. General Schwarzkopf emphasized that the mission was not to surround, envelope or damage, but to destroy the RG to the point that it was no longer an effective fighting force.

The plan was to be executed in four general phases, meaning that there might be some overlap between phases but that effort was to concentrate on the current phase’s mission. Phases 1 concentrated on strategic bombing of critical facilities to cut off the leadership and support structure. Phase 2 would defeat decisively Iraq’s air defenses and her air force, to gain air superiority. Phase 3 concentrated on the fielded Iraqi army, to reduce its effectiveness to 50% or less, measured by major combat systems destroyed. The final phase was the ground fight.<sup>61</sup>

By November, Iraq’s army was arrayed in Kuwait, with 28 divisions stretching from the Persian Gulf to southern Iraq and deployed in depth. Defenses along the border were composed primarily of infantry divisions positioned behind extensive and improving

obstacle systems<sup>62</sup> with nearly 150 artillery battalions throughout the KTO in support.<sup>63</sup>

Behind these forward forces four heavy divisions were arrayed, acting as tactical reserves. Iraq's Republican Guard in the KTO at this time, consisted of four divisions, two armored, one mechanized and one motorized infantry.

Iraq deployed the great majority of its army in Kuwait, thus setting itself up for the Coalition left hook. The RG forces straddled the Kuwait-Iraq border southwest of Basrah to act as a theater reserve as it had done during the Iran-Iraq war. In that conflict the RG, Iraq's heaviest and most mobile force, had acted as the fireman to close enemy penetrations and to capitalize on success.<sup>64</sup>

Schwarzkopf anticipated a four pronged ground attack. In the east near the coast, the Eastern Area Command (EAC), composed mostly of Saudi units, would attack into Southern Kuwait to fix enemy forces and focus their attention to that area. To their west, near the elbow, the Marines would penetrate Iraqi defenses, fix the enemy tactical reserves south of As Salem airfield and link up with Northern Area Command forces. West of the Marines, Northern Area Command (NAC) forces, mostly Egyptians, would seize the critical road network northwest of Kuwait City then retake the city in conjunction with EAC Arab forces.<sup>65</sup> In the far west the Third Army's US XVIIIth Corps was to strike deep to the Euphrates River and cut the route of escape between Baghdad and Basrah south of the river and protect the western flank. East of the XVIIIth Corps, and west of the tri-border area, the US VIIth corps, the main effort, would strike north, then east, to envelope and destroy the RG forces in theater. The Army's 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division would be theater reserve and a Marine amphibious force would demonstrate in the Persian Gulf to portray an amphibious landing.<sup>66</sup>

CENTCOM prepared and sent to General Powell a proposed strategic directive on November 18<sup>th</sup>. In it Schwarzkopf outlined the major strategic goals of his plan for Desert Storm and in broad terms, his authority to act to accomplish those goals. The campaign objectives were to: destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical production facilities and their weapons of mass destruction; occupy southeastern Iraq until the strategic objectives were realized; destroy or neutralize the Republican Guard; neutralize Iraq's national command authority; safeguard detained foreign nationals in Iraq; and disrupt strategic air defenses. This strategic directive was not formally published by the Bush administration or acknowledged directly before or after the war. Schwarzkopf says, "It disappeared without a trace",<sup>67</sup> however, the military goals and their linkage to the overall political goals were, at least, implicitly agreed to by the administration. After the war these same military goals are noted as being issued to CENTCOM by the Secretary of Defense, in the Title V, Interim Report to Congress.<sup>68</sup>

Schwarzkopf's concept briefing lacked the details needed for execution. He had, in fact, issued guidance to the planners that they should not get too involved in the details, subordinate commanders would do that.<sup>69</sup> It was up to Third Army and the respective corps to refine the Army plan, while the Marines and Arab forces continued their own planning. LTG John Yeosock, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Commander, received concept briefings from LTG Luck, XVIIIth Corps Commander on 30 November, and LTG Franks, VIIth Corps Commander on 7 December. Although suggested by the corps commanders, modifications resulting from these briefings were minimal and planning continued.<sup>70</sup>

Between November and G-day or ground attack day, more than planning had to be accomplished. The entire VIIth Corps had to be moved from Germany to the theater,

along with the 1<sup>st</sup> I.D. and other units from CONUS. Third Army had to plan and execute the move of two full corps to battle positions, one from ports on the Gulf, the other from its locations in the Saudi Desert, and all within three months. Third Army also had to plan, then execute, the main attack of Desert Storm.

Air planning continued in concert with the ground campaign plan. LTC Joe Purvis met regularly with BG Glosson to iron out details and coordinate actions to insure concerted action. The air portion of Desert Storm was largely finalized in December 1990, and execution began on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1991.<sup>71</sup> The air offensive was extremely successful and progressed as outlined here. First, from 17-21 (dates approximate) January, Iraq's integrated air defense was targeted in order to gain freedom of action in the air. Next, from 17 January to about 2 February, offensive counter air sorties targeted airfields and air force itself to gain air superiority. Then, from about January 19<sup>th</sup> through February 15<sup>th</sup>, Coalition airpower concentrated on attacking Iraq's strategic command and control to isolate their forces in the KTO. Next the air forces attacked the enemy logistics and lines of communication into the KTO followed by attacks on the fielded army. Throughout the air campaign, sorties were directed at SCUD missile sites and weapons of mass destruction as acquired.<sup>72</sup>

In addition to the destruction the air attack wrought on Iraq's fighting capabilities, it allowed the US 3<sup>rd</sup> Army to reposition without threat of Iraqi aerial observation. The onslaught also made it very difficult for Iraq to reposition her forces without significant threat of destruction. These effects greatly facilitated both planning and execution of the ground plan. A critical concern for the overall plan was the possibility that Iraq might agree to the UN resolutions prior to the execution of the ground operation. Nonetheless,

execution of the ground option became a final and distinct phase requiring permission from the NCA to commence.<sup>73</sup>

Ground attack planning by CENTCOM elements was ongoing as the air operations continued and the situation evolved. Third Army held a Commander's meeting on February 1<sup>st</sup> to review the ground plan. The most important result of this meeting was to decide how the RG would be engaged and destroyed and to resolve the timing of the attacks. The plan assumed the RG would stay in place, just north of Kuwait. Third Army would attack with two corps abreast. XVIIIth Corps on the west flank, would attack north then, on order, turn right (east) with its heavy forces. The VIIth Corps would drive north, and turn east to attack the Republican Guard Forces located in the northern portion of the KTO. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Army concept was to, essentially, set the conditions for the destruction of the RG through this maneuver. LTG Yeosock, however, did not want to issue a detailed plan at this point, preferring to wait to see what the enemy would do and to issue FRAGO's or audibles as needed.<sup>74</sup>

Third Army held another critical meeting on February 8<sup>th</sup> in preparation for a final briefing to the Secretary of Defense the following day. LTG Franks asked if anyone had addressed end state during the planning process but received no answer. The next day, Defense Secretary Cheney asked the same question of General Franks. The question seems to have gone unresolved only to arise again at war's end.<sup>75</sup>

The plan changed only slightly after mid February and the missions and intents for the major commands remained unchanged. The CENTCOM mission was to, on order, conduct offensive operations to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy Iraq's offensive warfighting capability. It must then be prepared to defend Kuwait. The CINC's

intent was to fight weakness with strength and prepare the battlefield with SOF, psyops, and deception. He would utilize airpower to target the enemy leadership, command and control, LOC's, weapons of mass destruction, the Republican Guards and attrit the fielded army. The main effort, in the west, would cut the LOC's, the enemy's escape routes, and destroy the RG. Air power would block escape to the north across the Euphrates River. The offensive would terminate when the RG was destroyed and major US forces were positioned along the critical LOC's in the KTO. Following this scenario CENTCOM forces would prepare to defend Kuwait.

The predominately Saudi Joint Forces Command East (JFC-East), would attack to penetrate Iraqi defenses and protect the right flank of MARCENT by destroying enemy forces in zone. On order, the JFC East was to occupy Kuwait City in coordination with Joint Forces Command North (JFC-North) forces.

MARCENT was to attack to penetrate and destroy enemy forces in zone and to prevent reinforcement of forces facing the JFC-North. It also had to seize geographical objectives southeast of Al Jahra to support occupation and defense of Kuwait City.

The predominately Egyptian JFC North would attack to penetrate and destroy Iraqi forces in zone and prevent reinforcement of enemy forces facing Third Army. They were to seize objectives north of Al Salem airfield and block the LOC's north of Kuwait City. JFC-North would then, on order, occupy Kuwait City in coordination with JFC-East.

Third Army, the main effort, would attack, on order, to destroy enemy forces in zone and to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC).<sup>76</sup> The XVIIIth Corps Commander's Concept was to strike deep to the Euphrates River Valley with the 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault to cut highway 8, the major road between the KTO and Baghdad. The heavy

units of the corps (24 ID(M) and 3ACR) would drive north across the desert, link up along highway 8 with the 101st, then, on order, attack east toward Basrah just north of VIIth Corps to complete the destruction of the RGFC. The corps would thus support the attack of VIIth Corps. LTG Luck did not intend to attack into Basrah and was primarily oriented on geographical objectives.

The VIIth Corps commander's concept was to breach the Iraqi defense west of the Wadi Al-Batin with the 1<sup>st</sup> ID(M) then pass through the British 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division. After this, if possible, the 1<sup>st</sup> ID(M), would continue to attack north and rejoin the corps. The British force was to attack east to destroy the enemy second echelon heavy forces and protect the corps southern flank. The 2nd ACR, and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> AD's would attack west of the breach, beyond the enemy defensive belts, and drive north then east. LTG Franks intended to form his corps into a three division fist as they approached the northern portion of Kuwait, thereby hitting the RGFC with at least three divisions at once. His objective was primarily force oriented although, due to the speed of the attack and relative immobility of the enemy, geographical objectives assisted in orienting the forces.

The theater reserve was the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, assembled just south of the Wadi Al-Batin. The division was to attack enemy defenses near the Wadi with aviation and artillery, and feint with one brigade. This was to deceive the Iraqi's that an attack would occur up the Wadi and fix forces there. General Schwartzkopf also promised to use the division to reinforce the Egyptians in JFC-North, if required. If not needed, the 1<sup>st</sup> CAV would, upon the CINC's approval, be released to the VIIth Corps.<sup>77</sup>

Units would attack over two days. The Marines, JFC-East, the French Light Armored Division, the 101<sup>st</sup>, and 82<sup>nd</sup>(-) would attack at H-hour, G-day. JFC-North, VIIth Corps, and the heavy forces of XVIIIth Corps would attack the next day. This staggering of attack times was intended to focus the Iraqi's toward Kuwait in the east while presenting a threat to Baghdad and enabling a swift assault into the Euphrates Valley in the west.<sup>78</sup>

Two other points require emphasis as they were critical to successful execution of the plan. First is the deception effort. The intent was for the Iraqi's to believe that the main Coalition force would strike through Kuwait and up the Wadi Al-Batin and that the Iraqi's must prepare to resist an amphibious assault along the coast, much like Inchon. This caused Iraq to keep most of its forces within Kuwait and enabled ARCENT forces to reposition west to their attack positions. Second, one must emphasize the immeasurable importance of the transportation and logistics effort without which this Desert Storm plan would not have succeeded. The detailed planning and execution of that effort offer infinite lessons in how to support operations.

By mid February, the forces were in place for the ground offensive and the final battle to liberate Kuwait. In Washington, on February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1990, (0600 the 24<sup>th</sup> Saudi time) President Bush announced, "I have, therefore, directed General Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with Coalition Forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait."<sup>79</sup> The political objective remained unchanged yet a precise end state was not addressed in the plan, even though the question "what will it look like?" had been asked.

### Chapter III. The Ground War.

February 24<sup>th</sup>, Day 1.

At 0400 lead elements of the 6<sup>th</sup> French Light Armored Division and, the attached, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, crossed the line of departure in the far west of the Coalition front. They were en route to secure their first objective, White, in the vicinity of As Salman, 90 miles into Iraq. To their east, the 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division lifted off at 0727 (2.5 hours late due to bad weather) for its initial objective, Cobra. Upon landing, at 0815, the air assault troops met with light resistance. Both the French and American forces quickly overwhelmed the weak Iraqi resistance and prepared for their next missions.<sup>80</sup>

The Marines, with one Army heavy brigade attached, attacked at 0400 as well. With the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division on the right flank, 2nd Division on the left and the Army brigade guarding the left flank, MARCENT forces moved rapidly through the Iraqi defenses.

By noon the first day, the Marines penetrated the first belt of the thick Iraqi defenses and were attacking the second defensive belt, nearly 20 miles into Kuwait. By nightfall, the Marines would penetrate the second belt, seize Al Jaber airfield and be poised to attack to Kuwait City in the morning. As night fell, LTG Boomer, MARCENT Commander, halted the advance due to the day's success and the dearth of night vision equipment among the Marines. In the course of 16 hours MARCENT had gained half of its objectives for the campaign. They had suffered minimal casualties and captured over 8000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW's).<sup>81</sup>

To the right, Joint Forces Command East had success as well. They had attacked at H-hour, up the coast road, into Kuwait. By late afternoon the Arab forces were over 10 miles into the Iraqi defense and overwhelmed with EPW's.<sup>82</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> CD crossed the line of departure to attack the Iraqi 27<sup>th</sup> ID near the Wadi Al-Batin. The 1<sup>st</sup> CD had conducted probing attacks over the previous week to draw enemy attention to the area. They would, over the next two days, make contact with five different enemy divisions in the Wadi area. This may indicate that Iraq had reinforced the area to prepare for what they thought, would be a significant attack.<sup>83</sup>

Reports from across the Coalition front were very positive. The Iraqi infantry was surrendering in large numbers in all sectors and the Iraqi second echelon heavy forces, positioned for quick and decisive counterattacks, were largely ineffective. The Iraqi 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps did attempt to counterattack against the Marine penetration but did little more than delay the advance and cause the deaths of more Iraqi soldiers.<sup>84</sup>

General Schwartzkopf, who had been very attentive to the developments, began to sense that he should advance the attack times for the other Coalition forces. The CINC was spurred to action by incoming reports that the Iraqi's were destroying the desalination plant in Kuwait City, its only reliable source of fresh water. An additional report, from a Kuwaiti resistance organization, stated that the Iraqi's were beginning to execute some prisoners.<sup>85</sup>

The rapidity of the advance concerned the CINC, as well, because, in the plan, to concentrate forces on the RGFC, still located just north of Kuwait, timing was critical. The plan called for a one day delay before VIIth Corps and the XVIIIth Corps heavy units were to attack. Due to the rapid advances, a one day delay was not necessary and

could be detrimental. It now looked as if the Marine left flank could be exposed unless the Egyptians attacked soon and that the Iraqi army might fold or escape before Third Army forces could destroy them.

Schwartzkopf contacted LTG Yeosock and LTG Khalid before 0900 and asked if their units could attack early. After conferring with their respective subordinates, the two subordinate commanders decided that they could initiate early and agreed to a 1500 time to begin the attack.<sup>86</sup> The remaining forces of the Coalition officially began their attacks over 15 hours earlier than planned (originally 0600, G+1)<sup>87</sup>.

By the end of the first days fighting the Coalition was far ahead of schedule. In the XVIIIth Corps zone, the French and 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne forces held objective Rochambeau. The 101<sup>st</sup> was occupying FOB Cobra, and the 24<sup>th</sup> ID(M) and 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR would continue to drive most of the night toward the Euphrates.<sup>88</sup> The VIIth Corps had opened a breach into the Iraqi defense with the 1<sup>st</sup> ID(M), and was expanding it while preparing to pass the British 1<sup>st</sup> Armored through in the morning. The 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR, 1<sup>st</sup> AD, and 3rd AD had penetrated over 50 kms into Iraq and destroyed an enemy brigade.<sup>89</sup> Further east, JFC-North was completing its breach of the first defensive belt. The Marines possessed Al Jaber airfield and Joint Force Command-East was 10 miles into Iraq along the coast.<sup>90</sup> The day was unexpectedly successful and the CINC says he "went to bed content".<sup>91</sup>

February 25, Day Two.

General Powell talked with General Schwartzkopf a number of times on the 25<sup>th</sup> and was able to keep the President and Secretary of Defense informed of the situation in the

KTO. All three were pleased with the events of the previous day and indicated no change in the goals of the campaign.

JFC-E was continuing to advance north and contending with large numbers of prisoners. By the end of the day's fighting, JFC-E would seize all of its planned objectives and be just south of Kuwait City.<sup>92</sup> MARCENT encountered heavy resistance in the form of a two brigade Iraqi counterattack that started around 0930 and originated from the Al Burqan oil field. This attack, aimed, primarily, at the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, delayed the Marines for much of the day. MARCENT concluded the 25<sup>th</sup> within 10 miles of the Kuwait City airport.<sup>93</sup>

JFC-North began the day having completed their breaches through the first defensive belt. By the end of the day they had fought through the fire trenches to breach the second defensive belt passing an entire division through by nightfall. The JFC-North forces would be poised to attack the outskirts of Kuwait City the next morning.

In the XVIIIth Corps zone, the 6<sup>th</sup> French and 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne seized objective White, the As Salman airfield and road junction, in mid- afternoon.<sup>94</sup> The 101<sup>st</sup> attacked, via UH-60, to secure AO Eagle, just south of Al Khidr on the Euphrates River, then occupied LZ Sand 25 miles south of Eagle to support their operations in the valley. Just after midnight on the 26<sup>th</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 101<sup>st</sup> cut highway 8, effectively blocking Iraqi escape along the route. The 24<sup>th</sup> ID and 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR continued to drive north meeting light resistance. By the end of the day the 24<sup>th</sup> would be ready to attack the final few kilometers to cut the highway east of An-Nasiriyah.<sup>95</sup>

The VIIth Corps situation began the morning of the 25<sup>th</sup>, much as it had ended the previous night. The CINC became distressed at this and urged the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Commander,

LTG Yeosock, to speed the advance of VIIth Corps. The CINC expected a continuous advance to destroy the RGFC while LTG Franks, the Corps Commander, had to deal with the intricacies of moving four heavy divisions, numerous artillery brigades, and an ACR while in contact. The disparity in the viewpoints will impact again later, in the final hours of the ground war.

VIIth Corps, in contact most of this day, continued to attack north. By the end of the 25<sup>th</sup> the Corps fist was beginning to take shape, the British 1<sup>st</sup> Armored was attacking east, and the 1<sup>st</sup> ID began moving north about 0200 on the 26<sup>th</sup>. <sup>96</sup> LTG Franks also issued FRAGO 7, ordering the corps to begin its wheel east to destroy the withdrawing RGFC. <sup>97</sup>

Late in the day the CINC conveyed to General Yeosock his concern that a cease-fire might occur within 48 hours. ARCENT must, therefore, press its attack on the RGFC. <sup>98</sup> This violated or, at least indicated a change, from the original intent of the CENTCOM plan. Planners, with the CINC's approval, had made the critical assumption that political pressures would not interfere with consummation of the operational plan. <sup>99</sup>

February 26<sup>th</sup>, Day Three.

The day began early with Baghdad's announcement that Iraq's forces would withdraw from Kuwait. President Bush did not change the policy or plan but reiterated the requirement that Iraq must accept the UN resolutions and that it was too late for a simple withdrawal. The war thus continued.

Iraq's announcement was apparent on the battlefield. In the east, the Iraqi III Corps hastened north, out of Kuwait, offering little resistance to the advancing JFC-E or the Marines. By the end of this third day, JFC-E would be just outside Kuwait City awaiting

coordination with JFC-N to enter the city. The Marines would be poised to complete seizure of the international airport early on the 27<sup>th</sup>, while the attached Tiger Brigade held Al-Jahra and the Mutlah ridge, the critical terrain and road network west of the city.<sup>100</sup>

To the west, JFC-N continued to drive toward Kuwait City seizing Ali Al Salem Airfield by day's end, poised to enter the capital in the morning.

The XVIIIth Corps continued its advance to block the Euphrates. The 101<sup>st</sup> had already interdicted highway 8 and this was reinforced at about 1400 with the arrival of the heavy, 24 ID(M). The 24<sup>th</sup> cut the road, cleared a mass of enemy artillery just north of the highway, then prepared to turn east, early on the 27<sup>th</sup>. The French and 82<sup>nd</sup> would establish a screen line over 100 miles long, from the Euphrates back to the Saudi border.<sup>101</sup>

In the VIIth Corps sector the RGFC had decided to fight in order to allow as much of their army to escape through Basrah, as possible. The Guard deployed with the Tawakalna division with parts of the 52<sup>nd</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> AD's, the Medina and the Hammurabi divisions arrayed to protect Basrah and the road north out of Kuwait. These forces were not fleeing, but planned to fight from successive defensive positions.<sup>102</sup>

LTG Franks' preparation and staging of his forces set the corps up for the attack of the 26<sup>th</sup> into the RGFC defense. The Corps was arrayed on the afternoon of the 26<sup>th</sup> from north to south with 1<sup>st</sup> AD, 3<sup>rd</sup> AD, 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR, and the 1<sup>st</sup> UK AD. The 1<sup>st</sup> ID would attempt to pass through the 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR to sustain the offense. To the north of the VIIth Corps, the 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR and the 24<sup>th</sup> ID(M) would continue their attack east once they secured their original objectives. All night of the 26<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> the VIIth Corp continued fighting east through the Iraqi defenses.<sup>103</sup>

February 27<sup>th</sup>, the last day.

LTG Prince Khaled coordinated the seizure and occupation of Kuwait City early on the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup> and ordered JFC-E and JFC-N to move at first light. That morning, at about 0900, the first Arab columns began moving into the city, which had been largely evacuated by Iraq. They met in central Kuwait City then continued to liberate the rest of the city.<sup>104</sup>

The Marines consolidated on the international airport and prepared to fight again if ordered to do so. Their fight was over, except for some security operations.<sup>105</sup>

The main effort continued to the north of the capital as VIIth and XVIIIth Corps attacked eastward, into the defending RGFC. The RGFC was still capable of large unit defense as the day began. The Tawakalna Division was largely destroyed but the Medinah Division was attempting to establish a defense of the LOC's south of Basrah to allow forces to flee into the city and north. The Hammurabi attempted to defend the Rumaila oil field west of Basrah, supported by elements of the Adnan and Al Faw infantry divisions. The RGFC still had fight in it and was still trying to protect its escape route to the north.<sup>106</sup>

The 24<sup>th</sup> ID, now with the 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR under its operational control, attacked east, first securing Jalibah airfield then continuing east to engage Iraqi soldiers and units attempting to flee the Basrah pocket. Meanwhile, the 101<sup>st</sup> launched Apache attacks northwest of Basrah in an attempt to further destroy and block the fleeing army. The 24<sup>th</sup> would stop to prepare for a deliberate attack set for 0400 the morning of the 28<sup>th</sup>. The

division would end the war about 30 miles west of downtown Basrah only able to engage the enemy divisions to its front with artillery due to the timing of the cease-fire.

The VIIth Corps fought much of the night and through the day destroying a great deal of enemy equipment and much of the Medinah RGFC division. For the 28<sup>th</sup>, LTG Franks planned a double envelopment of the remaining RGFC south of Basrah, using the now attached 1<sup>st</sup> CD in the north and 1<sup>st</sup> ID(M) to close on the Persian Gulf, in the south. The 1<sup>st</sup> UK would continue to attack east, through the enemy.<sup>107</sup> Given time to execute this plan, and the known enemy disposition, Third Army would have fully encircled the heavy forces of the RGFC, accomplishing its assigned military objective.

By late afternoon the Corps encountered less of a coherent defense, and more fights with scattered Iraqi units. The VIIth Corps continued east into the night prepared for what was estimated to be one more day of fighting with the RGFC. During the night, however, as plans for the next days final actions were being made, the cease fire order arrived from 3<sup>rd</sup> Army. First it said to be prepared to cease offensive action at 0500, then, at 0500, the time changed to 0800 causing a significant start/ stop effect among the soldiers. LTG Franks had his divisions attack east as long as possible then, stop as the time arrived.<sup>108</sup>

#### The Cease-Fire Decision.

Rumblings about an early end to the fighting could be detected around CENTCOM soon after the Iraqi decision to evacuate Kuwait. These were not entertained long, however, due to the tremendous success of the Coalition forces, it would not be long before a cease-fire occurred anyway. At the CENTCOM morning briefing in Riyahd reports of the enemy's demise were numerous. In the east, Iraq's II Corps was in full

retreat, the IIIrd and IVth Corps were utterly destroyed, and much of Iraq's VIIth Corps had collapsed. The Coalition had captured over 38,000 prisoners and more gave up every minute. Coalition casualties were minimal and Kuwait City was nearly free. Following the brief, the CINC told his staff to begin planning for the redeployment.

The afternoon of the 27th, interviews of Coalition pilots just back from bombing Iraqi's on the "Highway of Death", the road between Kuwait City and Basrah, were broadcast by reporters. These gave the impression that the Coalition was engaged in wanton killing of fleeing Iraqi soldiers. This event, coupled with the unanticipated successes of the previous days, caused a number of the critical decision makers in Washington, and at CENTCOM, to ponder if it were time to end the fighting. That same afternoon, the CINC spoke with LTG Yeosock about the battlefield situation. Yeosock indicated that his forces needed one more day to finish the RGFC. That would end the war after five days, sometime late on the 28<sup>th</sup> or early on March 1<sup>st</sup>.

Following the reports of the "highway of death", General Powell called General Schwarzkopf and warned that the doves, in Washington, were voicing their opinion that a cease fire might be appropriate. The CINC agreed that it was time to think about the cease-fire but reiterated his desire to continue for another day to fully destroy the RGFC. General Schwarzkopf, at the end of the conversation, decided to give a news briefing that evening on the theater situation and war to date.<sup>109</sup>

The extensive briefing that evening was very successful in conveying a picture to the world that Iraq was all but beaten. The CINC emphasized that the escape routes were closed, that no armored forces could leave the KTO, and that the complete destruction of the RGFC was imminent. He claimed that 21 Iraqi divisions were combat ineffective, that

the Coalition held over 50,000 EPW's, and that over 3800 enemy tanks had been destroyed.

Perhaps the most critical statement made by the CINC in this briefing was in answer to the question of whether all the Coalition's objectives were met. The CINC answered that they had been and that he was willing to stop the war when ordered to do so. Perhaps General Schwarzkopf was simply referring to the political objectives of freeing Kuwait, restoring its government, and destroying Iraq's offensive capability. Each of these could reasonably be assumed to have been accomplished based on the data at hand. The CINC also had recently expressed to the CJCS that he wanted another day and believed at the time he would get it and may not have anticipated a quick cease fire decision.<sup>110</sup>

General Powell, just after the briefing, explained the situation to the President, who acknowledged that the objectives were largely accomplished. The President then asked if a cease-fire was appropriate, why not do it now? The CJSC asked the CINC, and he agreed but asked to check with his subordinates. The Washington group believed a cease-fire was the thing to do. The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Advisor were concerned about world opinion and believed that a few more destroyed enemy tanks would mean little.<sup>111</sup>

The President was also conferring with other members of the Coalition who did not want to see wanton destruction either. King Fahd was very concerned that a completely destroyed Iraq would erupt into civil war and, perhaps, spread Shiite fundamentalism to his Kingdom. Both the King and President Mubarak of Egypt stated they were prepared to live with Saddam as long as his WMD were neutralized.<sup>112</sup>

Schwarzkopf conferred with LTG Yeosock and indicated that a cease-fire would probably occur around 0500 on the 28<sup>th</sup>. The CINC agreed to the cease-fire in a subsequent talk with the CJCS. In the theater, the warning order for a 0500 cease-fire was issued at about 2300. The order essentially took the wind out of the offensive and was interpreted by Yeosock as an order to insure that friendly casualties should be avoided, if possible. The CINC told 3<sup>rd</sup> Army to continue to launch Apache attacks but nothing that could not be reigned in on time.

Several hours later the CJCS informed General Schwarzkopf that the cease-fires time had changed to 0800 (local) so as to make it a 100 hour war. President Bush stipulated initially to Schwarzkopf, that the Iraqi's must leave all their heavy equipment behind but this was later changed when CENTCOM reasoned that if the Iraqi's decided not to walk home, it could result in more fighting.

Some Third Army units continued to fight but the situation was not clear. The units had been turned off, then on. They were tired after the days of continuous fighting. VIIth Corps ended the fight with the 1<sup>st</sup> CAV 60 kms from Basrah in the north, the 1<sup>st</sup> ID 15 km from Safwan, the 1<sup>st</sup> UK astride highway 8, north of Kuwait City and 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> AD's were 25 kms east of highway 8. The XVIIIth Corps had the 24<sup>th</sup> ID and 3 ACR still about 25 km east of Basrah.<sup>113</sup>

The Iraqi's had a number of scattered units south and west of Basrah with only the Hammurabi judged to be effective as a division. These remnants were, however, moving to Basrah, then north to escape and fight again.

The decision to stop the war at 100 hours was based on a number of considerations. First, as stated by President Bush in his eloquent announcement of the cease-fire, the

goals of the Coalition had been achieved and representatives would meet in two days to discuss cease-fire terms. Second, the military mission to destroy Iraq's RGFC and WMD appeared to have been accomplished. The fog of war may have blurred the vision from Riyahd but enemy forces were largely destroyed. Iraq's army went from the world's fourth largest to 22<sup>nd</sup> in a matter of weeks.<sup>114</sup> Third, the perception that the US was needlessly killing enemy soldiers, especially Arab ones, would not support America's long term interests in the region. Lastly, no one wanted to see more Coalition soldiers killed if it were not necessary.

A prime intent in the original CENTCOM plan was to destroy the RGFC and Iraq's offensive capability. The perception at the time of the cease-fire was that this had been accomplished. To go further may have exceeded the culminating point of the victory and offered little reward but greater political risk. Second guessing following the decision was common but, absent a decision to oust Saddam, it is reasonable to agree that the window for the cease-fire was reached and the proper decision made.

The greater concern here rests in the fact that the end state was never defined prior to the cease-fire. No one at CENTCOM knew what to look for other than the Coalition's control of Kuwait and destruction of the RGFC. There were no clear measures of effectiveness. Schwartzkopf was surprised to learn that he would attend the cease fire talks. Neither he, nor his staff, had prepared for or thought through the requirements and ramifications of such a meeting.

The cease-fire meeting occurred on March 3<sup>rd</sup> at Safwan, in southeastern Iraq. Mostly military matters were discussed such as; separation of the forces, prisoner exchange, and use of military equipment. The latter issue led to the use of Iraq's helicopters to suppress

rebels, to the chagrin of the Coalition. Schwarzkopf stated that he had not prepared for the talks before the cease-fire and was thus unable to anticipate well the ramifications the discussions. Had he been ready, perhaps the subsequent troubles with the regime in Iraq would not have occurred.<sup>115</sup>

#### Chapter IV. End State Doctrine in 1991.

February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1991, President Bush, speaking from the Oval Office, announced that Kuwait was once again free, that the fighting would stop at the 100 hour mark, and that the Coalition's objectives had been accomplished.<sup>116</sup>

The political objectives referred to by the President were the same that had been initially formulated in August, 1990, soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Secretary Cheney, General Powell and others in the administration agreed that the stated political objectives were met at the time of the cease-fire.

Full achievement of the stated military objective to destroy the RGFC remains open to debate, however. According to CIA documents released after the war, based on imagery and other technical assets, about half of the RGFC equipment remained in the KTO at the time of the cease fire and would move north over the next few weeks.<sup>117</sup> The CINC, in numerous briefings during the planning of Desert Storm, had emphasized his intention to destroy the RGFC, to not let it escape to menace other nations again. Destruction of half of the RGFC equipment in Kuwait, it can be argued, did not meet with this intent.

The events surrounding the decision to execute the cease-fire were influenced by the rapidity of the advance, the fog of war, the time and distance factors involved, the political environment, and 'the CNN factor' among other variables. The point here is not to determine whether the decision to cease offensive operations was correct, or to second guess the Coalition leadership and call for the ousting of Saddam, but to examine whether an end state was planned for and what doctrine supported that planning if it occurred.

War Termination Strategy is critical to the campaign planning process. It provides the bridge between conflict and long term peace yet, as of 1990, joint publications made almost no mention of its importance, its relevance, or what planners or commanders might consider regarding the subject.<sup>118</sup> Some basic doctrine and conclusions regarding planning considerations and responsibilities could have been gleaned by the Desert Storm planners, however, from the extant publications.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the combatant command system in place during the Gulf War. The act places the combatant commander under the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense and charges the theater commander with carrying out all assigned missions and with authority over all aspects of military operations in his theater.<sup>119</sup>

Joint Publication (Test) 3-0, published in January, 1990, touches on the issues of translating national strategy into theater strategy. The publication views strategy as hierarchical. Combatant Commanders must study the national strategic objectives and the national military strategy, then translate these into relevant theater strategies. The result integrates both political and military objectives in formulating theater objectives.<sup>120</sup> Referring to theater strategy, JP (Test) 3-0 states, "In wartime, armed forces are

employed in joint or combined actions as part of campaigns or operations that encompass battles and engagements. Theater strategy should clearly describe the desired successful end state. ... the end state should be carefully defined, and in consonance with NCA guidance.”<sup>121</sup>

Joint Publication (Test) 3-0 was not widely circulated prior to the Gulf War but the concept that the CINC must translate national strategic goals into theater goals was not foreign to the Desert Storm planners. The planners, in one of their first acts, as noted in chapter 2 of this monograph, reviewed the guidance from the NCA and attempted to translate that guidance into theater strategic goals and military tasks. The Desert Storm missions to subordinate units developed out of that translation and the CINC’s vision for the battlefield.

The US Army’s keystone warfighting manual FM 100-5, Operations published in 1986 did not mention end state specifically, as part of war planning. The subject of discerning an end state is left to the commander to define in this document. One relevant paragraph discusses anticipation of events on the battlefield as critical to mission success.<sup>122</sup>

The manual has several paragraphs that deal with branches and sequels and their importance to the campaign plan. The section concludes with the generic admonishment that sequels to the future battle, whether involving victory, defeat, or something in the middle, should be planned in advance in order to capitalize on battlefield events and stay within the enemies’ decision cycle. Implicit in this statement is the fact that commanders must plan in advance the end state in order to know where their plan is going.<sup>123</sup>

The bottom line of the war termination doctrine at the time is that there was very little direct mention of it in the major doctrinal sources at the time. It was up to commanders and staffs how detailed they decided to get in termination planning as long as they linked the larger political and military goals in the campaign plan. The details and vision of the transition from fighting to peace were not emphasized.

The USMC publication FMFM 1, offered a few paragraphs on the subject of war termination and the linking of strategic objective to desired end state. The main point of the section is to admonish planners to think about end state during their planning and to visualize what and how the campaign should end. A salient observation applicable to the Gulf War states that, in a limited war, the desired end state is much more difficult to define clearly than in a war seeking unconditional surrender.<sup>124</sup>

FMFM 1-1, another USMC publication, states the importance of planning for an end state and linking that end state to the theater objectives. When this is properly accomplished, operational objectives can be developed to support attaining the desired end state condition.<sup>125</sup>

These facts are readily apparent in the Desert Storm planning. General Schwarzkopf admits as much when stating that he would “just wing it” at the cease fire talks to be held at Safwan.<sup>126</sup> He regarded the talks as strictly limited to military matters and that conclusive peace talks or a dialogue on terms would occur later. The Safwan discussion on 3 March, however, had long lasting implications which were by no means strictly military in nature.

The operational plan of Desert Storm went as far as the liberation of Kuwait and the envelopment of the RGFC with several sets of contingency plans on how the RGFC

would be destroyed. The final disposition of the forces was left to be planned during execution, after the enemy situation could be determined on the battlefield. That was the reason LTG Yeosock decided to call an “audible”. He wanted to wait until he knew what the RGFC was doing before calling the play, and for good reason. Problems resulted when political considerations developed that supported ending the fight in the absence of a concrete, measurable, military plan that required fulfillment. The military commanders, especially the CINC, had not thought through the ramifications thoroughly enough to be able to avoid an early end to the fighting. They could not support its continuance, because a well-defined military end state had not been determined, only the nebulous goal of the destruction of the RGFC with little thought given to how that fact would be recognized on the battlefield.

Commanders, and certainly planners, should have attempted to develop quantifiable measures as to how to define the intended military end state. In this case did that end state mean the destruction of all RGFC tanks and artillery, or some other measure that could be discerned through the fog of war and its confusing aftermath?

Additionally, the CINC and his planners, should have recognized the requirement for some sort of end state discussion between the two sides at the end of hostilities. This discussion would reasonably be attended by senior officers on both sides. Such talks are not without historical precedent, as they occurred at the end of the American Civil War, WWII, and Korea. The terms of such an action should have been worked out prior to the conflict, at least regarding the major requirements.

Minimal end state planning was done to support Desert Storm but only in the context of the rebuilding of Kuwait. It is commendable that that planning was done but the event

was largely fortuitous. The Kuwait Task Force or KTF developed from the action of Colonel Randall Elliot who, as a State Department employee and member of the 352<sup>nd</sup> Civil Affairs Command (Army Reserve), recognized the probable need to rebuild Kuwait after liberation.

The plan that developed did not link with CENTCOM operational plans and did not contribute or prompt any thought to conflict termination on the part of the CINC or his planners. Planning between the two was not synchronized, nor was the strategic vision developed fully in order to link it with the long term political or military requirements of the region. The KTF plan did not, therefore, address the battlefield requirements but only the needs of rebuilding Kuwait.<sup>127</sup>

Desert Storm was a military success beyond the expectations of the CINC, the NCA and the planners in the aspects of time, casualties, and achievement of the stated political objectives. Few predicted, before the fact, that the ground war would last only a few days. Perhaps the expectation for a longer campaign contributed to the apparent lack of conflict termination planning.

#### Chapter V. End State Doctrine in 1998.

Based on the US Military's experiences in Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Somalia, and Bosnia, the doctrine for war termination has evolved and continues to do so. The most readily available sources of doctrine that contain reference to end state are the Joint

Publications and FM 100-5. A new USMC publication FMFM 1-1 has not been released since the Gulf War.

Joint Publication 3-0 provides joint planners with several pages devoted to end state considerations and war termination. The publication also offers a significant explanation of how to link strategic political and military goals in the process of planning.

The new joint publication defines end state as the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments. Combatant commanders are charged with understanding the political end state desired, determining the strategic end state, then translating these into supporting military conditions. JP 3-0 charges that the NCA should provide clearly defined end states but also emphasizes that the CINC should seek clarification and refine military objectives to support the overarching goals.<sup>128</sup>

Perhaps most important, the new JP 3-0 identifies planning for conflict termination as critical to the success of the entire effort. It states, "Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military forces endure. ... conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, the national military strategy, and posthostility aims—the desired outcome."<sup>129</sup>

The section continues with the recognition, possibly resulting from the CENTCOM experience in 1991, that there may be an imposed period between the end of conflict and a negotiated peace. This truce period must be planned for and considered in the end state process and combatant commanders must be prepared for it.

Critical to Commanders and planners is the proposition that military strategic advice be given to political authorities regarding military objectives in support of termination.

This must lead Commanders and staffs to recognize their requirement to think through the end state, define what it should look like based on the political objectives, then recommend how to support the desired ends with military action if required. This is not a new concept to our military but it was not dictated in a joint publication until recently.

JP 3-0 charges the military with planning the transition from military control to civil control, as well. The emphasis here, once again, is on early planning and coordination. A last, critical, issue is that the planning done prior to hostilities must be reexamined and refined once the conflict starts. The requirements should be clarified and the campaign modified, if required, as the situation changes.<sup>130</sup>

Joint Publication 5-0 of April 1995 emphasizes the requirement for end state planning as part of campaign plans in its executive summary and provides further guidance in the campaign planning section. In the executive summary it says that a campaign plan, "clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy"<sup>131</sup>. CINC's then, and planners, are required to plan the intended end, a much improved position since the Gulf War. The manual reiterates these requirements in its section on campaign planning and also ties the refinement of military objectives to the political objectives provided by the NCA. The CINC must link these to his definition of end state in order to adequately plan for cessation of military operations.<sup>132</sup>

Both of these joint publications offer some insight into what must be planned regarding end state but do not provide significant detail. Perhaps they should not. The requirement that end state must be planned for as part of a campaign plan is significant. So too is the fact that theater campaign plans are to be briefed to, and approved by, the NCA before implementation.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps both will recognize in the future the necessity to

visualize an end state and the process sufficiently link the military operation to the political objectives.

The new Army warfighting manual, 100-5 contains significantly more content on end state than the edition applicable during the Gulf War. It references the joint publications and draws from them in including an end state plan as part of the campaign plan while also offering other insights into planning for end state. The new manual calls for a comprehensive view of military operations observing that military forces conduct either offense, defense, stability, or support operations. Theater commanders will plan and conduct these operations to create some desired end state within an operational design that links the ways and means available to the desired ends. A design for end state, or at least a visualization of it, is a requirement in the operational design. The military end state is defined here as the set of military conditions that marks the point where military force is no longer the principal means of reaching the strategic goals. The campaign plan then, seeks to define those conditions necessary for this to occur.

100-5 also points out that the military conditions are not the only ones that must be addressed. In the new comprehensive view of operations commanders operate not just in the military realm. They must be prepared to influence and call on the other instruments of national power to bring about the desired end state while focusing on the campaign's military objectives.

Commander's must also continue to monitor the campaign as the situation evolves. To aid in this, staffs should seek to create clearly definable and recognizable measures of effectiveness so that they can recognize the end state when it occurs. If that is not done, at least to some degree of effectiveness, future commanders may be in the same

predicament as CENTCOM on February 28, 1991. They could not effectively evaluate the situation of the RGFC or whether the military goals had been achieved because the measures of effectiveness had not been addressed.<sup>134</sup>

The end state doctrine contained in these publications does not contain everything that a planner or commander should know about the subject. It is, however, significantly improved over the publications available during Desert Storm. The primary result of the evolved doctrine will not be perfect planning for end state. It may only result in the inclusion of end state planning and war termination strategy into the campaign plan. If this is clearly linked to the achievement of the strategic and military goals then it has caused the commander and his staff to, at least, address end state in the context of defining the ends.

## Chapter VI. Conclusion.

The 1991 Gulf War provides innumerable lessons for the student of war at the beginning of a new century. An important one, is the fact that theater commanders, and his staff, must seek to define the desired end state conditions in order to support the transition from military operations to civilian control.

Clausewitz admonishes us to clearly understand why we go to war and what it is we seek to accomplish. He states, “No one starts a war- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”<sup>135</sup> Here, Clausewitz calls on strategists to define their overarching political goals, define the end state or condition they seek, then link these conditions and goals to a military objective or series of objectives. Following this sequence should assist in defining the requirements of the military force, as well.

The Gulf War can be thought of as beginning with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August, 1990. This event was followed quickly by a clear statement of the political goals by President Bush. These goals were; the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq, restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, stability in the Gulf region, and protection of American lives. Initially, due to force limitations and the absence of a political decision to go to war, CENTCOM’s main operational goal, was the defense of Saudi Arabia. This evolved over the Desert Shield period into the offensive plan to liberate Kuwait as discussed in this paper.

The CENTCOM and subordinate planners did study and attempt to link the political goals established by the NCA to the operational military objectives but they did not plan the end state required to support those goals, in enough depth.

The Desert Storm plan defined the significant military objective as destruction of the RGFC but its execution stopped short of that goal with the RGFC cornered north of Kuwait. The intent of the commanders was to destroy the remaining RGFC based on the situation as it existed. They did not get the chance and the decision to stop the fighting

was not based on concrete measures of effectiveness that had been determined prior to the war. The cease-fire meeting at Safwan, on March 3<sup>rd</sup>, was largely an ad hoc affair with little prior planning, as the CINC admitted.

The question of military end state was asked at least twice prior to the ground offensive, once by the VIIth Corps Commander and once by the Secretary of Defense. It is easy here then, after the fact, to indict the planners and decision makers as to the lack of a clearly defined end state. Perhaps someone should have observed, as well, the critical difference between the goals of a limited war and those of an unlimited war to replace a ruling power. End state definition is even more critical and difficult to clarify in such cases. The planners did, however, act within the existing doctrine, such as there was, and believed they would have time to define the end state as the fight drew on. Perhaps they were victims of their own success in this instance.

This does not prevent the political authority that initially gave the guidance to the theater commander from changing that guidance at any time. The political authority, or NCA, must have the absolute right to change objectives. During the Gulf War, it seems clear that the end state was not clearly defined and this lack of definition contributed to an early cease-fire. President Bush might not have elected to cease offensive action had he been presented a clearer picture of events and expectations on the ground.

The doctrine at the time was almost nonexistent. A few paragraphs existed in a largely unavailable test publication and some insight could be gained by studying FMFM 1-1 and FM 100-5. Little was written to say or require that a definition of end state be included in the campaign plan.

Current doctrine is much improved. Joint publications 3-0 and 5-0 offer some insight into the requirements of end state planning. The critical contribution, however, is that the joint publications now make end state definition a part of the plan. Planners and commanders must, or should, address end state in their plan and link it to the political and military goals. The military is no longer concerned with just winning the battles but also with the transition to stability.

The Army's new FM 100-5, although at this time not fully approved for release, echoes these points. It emphasizes the criticality of linking the political goals through the military objectives to the desired, and defined, end state.

Theater commanders must now include their vision for end state in their campaign plans whether in conflict, support or stability operation.

The Gulf War was a success but the question remains, would it have been more of a success if the end state had been more clearly defined? History will perhaps answer that, but, a critical lesson for current and future planners is the need for an end state vision with adequate and discernable measures of effectiveness so that the condition can be recognized. Military forces can then more effectively support political goals and the transition to long term stability. US military doctrine, since the Gulf War, has incorporated a number of necessary changes reflecting this recognition of the importance of end state planning. Future planners and leaders should recognize the requirement for such doctrine and that it will evolve, just as military tactics and strategy continue to evolve.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 283.

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<sup>33</sup> Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 87-90.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 410.

<sup>36</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Interim Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, July, 1991) 1-1.

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<sup>41</sup> Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 124.

<sup>42</sup> Purvis slides, document No. 2. From the Swain Collection at the Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The slides are from a briefing he presented on the planning of Desert Storm.

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<sup>45</sup> BG Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1994) 111-112. Originally published in 1993 by the Office of Chief of Staff, US Army

<sup>46</sup> Related by Ltc Eckhart of the planning group to Col. Richard Swain and Major Larry Heystek at a March 11, 1991 interview in Riyadh. From the Swain Collection at the Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

<sup>47</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 78.

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<sup>54</sup> Plans group interview, March 11, 1991.

<sup>55</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 83.

<sup>56</sup> Title V, Interim Report to Congress; 1991; p. 2-5.

Note: The CENTCOM planning team, in conjunction with the CINC, came to realize the critical importance of destroying the RG during the time between the Washington single corps option brief and the brief to the CJCS, in Riyadh. Initially, the RG was considered the operational center of gravity. Later it evolved into the key to future Iraqi aggression, thus requiring destruction based on the political goals. This will be brought out later in this paper in the CINC's strategy letter to the NCA.

<sup>57</sup> Plans group interview, March 11, 1991.

<sup>58</sup> Powell and Persico, My American Journey, 473.

<sup>59</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 218.

<sup>60</sup> President George Bush, "The Need for an Offensive Military Option"; speech of Nov 8, 1990 at a White House news conference. Obtained from the George Bush Library.

<sup>61</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 444.

<sup>62</sup> Schubert and Kraus, The Whirlwind War, 135.

<sup>63</sup> Scales, Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, 143.

<sup>64</sup> Schubert and Kraus, The Whirlwind War, 135-136.

<sup>65</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 92.

<sup>66</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 444-445.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 450-451.

<sup>68</sup> Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Interim Report to Congress. Department of Defense, 1-1.

<sup>69</sup> Plans group interview, March 11, 1991.

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<sup>70</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 93.

<sup>71</sup> Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993) 52.

<sup>72</sup> James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992) 146-154.

<sup>73</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 128.

<sup>74</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 222.

<sup>75</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 124.

<sup>76</sup> Purvis slide notes, document 52.

<sup>77</sup> Scales, Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, 148-150.

<sup>78</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 524.

<sup>79</sup> President George Bush, "Allied Ground Operations in the Persian Gulf," Military Review, September, 1991, 85.

<sup>80</sup> XVIIIth Airborne Corps Chronology, 24-28 February, 1991, 2-4.

<sup>81</sup> Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 366-370.

<sup>82</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, P. 524.

<sup>83</sup> Schubert and Kraus, The Whirlwind War, 178.

<sup>84</sup> Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 370.

<sup>85</sup> US News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory (New York: Random House, 1992) 303.

<sup>86</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 524-525.

<sup>87</sup> Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993) 392.

<sup>88</sup> XVIIIth Airborne Corps Chronology, 24-28 February, 1991, 5.

<sup>89</sup> Scales, Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, 224.

<sup>90</sup> Mazaar, Snider, and Blackwell, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned, 144.

<sup>91</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, P. 527.

<sup>92</sup> Mazaar, Snider, and Blackwell, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned, 144.

<sup>93</sup> Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, 414-415.

<sup>94</sup> XVIIIth Airborne Corps Chronology, 24-28 February, 1991, 12.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>96</sup> Swain, "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, 238.

<sup>97</sup> Hutchison, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Chronology and Fact Book, 125.

<sup>98</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 546.

<sup>99</sup> Purvis slides, document No. 2.

<sup>100</sup> US News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, 345-346.

<sup>101</sup> Mazaar, Snider, and Blackwell, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned, 148.

<sup>102</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 369.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 577.

<sup>104</sup> Prince General Khaled bin Sultan with Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) 410.

<sup>105</sup> Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, 460.

<sup>106</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 404.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 407-408.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 440-441.

<sup>109</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 541-542.

<sup>110</sup> General H. Norman Schwartzkopf, "Central Command Briefing," Military Review, September, 1991, 100-108.

<sup>111</sup> Powell, My American Journey, 507.

<sup>112</sup> US News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, 395.

<sup>113</sup> Clancy and Franks, Into The Storm, 445.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 476.

<sup>115</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 566.

<sup>116</sup> President George Bush, "Kuwait is Liberated," US State Department Dispatch, March 4, 1991.

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<sup>117</sup> Gordon and Trainor, The General's War, 465.

<sup>118</sup> LTC David Kerrick, "Conflict Termination: It's Not Just for Politicians Anymore," (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1997) 2-3.

<sup>119</sup> Goldwater-Nichols Act, Chapter 6, paragraph 164.

<sup>120</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 (Test) : Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1990, I-3.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., I-4.

<sup>122</sup> Field manual 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986) 23.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>124</sup> FMFM 1, Warfighting (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 6 March 1989) 34-35.

<sup>125</sup> FMFM 1-1, Campaigning (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 25 June 1990) 33-35.

<sup>126</sup> Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, 556.

<sup>127</sup> John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992) viii.

<sup>128</sup> Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1 February 1995. I-10.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., I-9.

<sup>130</sup> Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations. III-2.

<sup>131</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995, xiii.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., II-18.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., II-19.

<sup>134</sup> FM 100-5, Operations. Revised Final Draft, as of 23 March, 1998 (Headquarters, Department of the Army) 2-35.

<sup>135</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War (ed. And translators Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976) 579.

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